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Summary	and	Keywords
Emergency	and	disaster	planning	involves	a	coordinated,	co-operative	process	of	preparing	to	match	urgent
needs	with	available	resources.	The	phases	are	research,	writing,	dissemination,	testing,	and	updating.	Hence,	an
emergency	plan	needs	to	be	a	living	document	that	is	periodically	adapted	to	changing	circumstances	and	that
provides	a	guide	to	the	protocols,	procedures,	and	division	of	responsibilities	in	emergency	response.	Emergency
planning	is	an	exploratory	process	that	provides	generic	procedures	for	managing	unforeseen	impacts	and	should
use	carefully	constructed	scenarios	to	anticipate	the	needs	that	will	be	generated	by	foreseeable	hazards	when
they	strike.	Plans	need	to	be	developed	for	specific	sectors,	such	as	education,	health,	industry,	and	commerce.
They	also	need	to	exist	in	a	nested	hierarchy	that	extends	from	the	local	emergency	response	(the	most
fundamental	level),	through	the	regional	tiers	of	government,	to	the	national	and	international	levels.	Failure	to	plan
can	be	construed	as	negligence	because	it	would	involve	failing	to	anticipate	needs	that	cannot	be	responded	to
adequately	by	improvisation	during	an	emergency.
Plans	are	needed,	not	only	for	responding	to	the	impacts	of	disaster,	but	also	to	maintain	business	continuity	while
managing	the	crisis,	and	to	guide	recovery	and	reconstruction	effectively.	Dealing	with	disaster	is	a	social	process
that	requires	public	support	for	planning	initiatives	and	participation	by	a	wide	variety	of	responders,	technical
experts	and	citizens.	It	needs	to	be	sustainable	in	the	light	of	challenges	posed	by	non-renewable	resource
utilization,	climate	change,	population	growth,	and	imbalances	of	wealth.	Although,	at	its	most	basic	level,
emergency	planning	is	little	more	than	codified	common	sense,	the	increasing	complexity	of	modern	disasters	has
required	substantial	professionalization	of	the	field.	This	is	especially	true	in	light	of	the	increasing	role	in
emergency	response	of	information	and	communications	technology.	Disaster	planners	and	coordinators	are
resource	managers,	and	in	the	future,	they	will	need	to	cope	with	complex	and	sophisticated	transfers	of	human
and	material	resources.	In	a	globalizing	world	that	is	subject	to	accelerating	physical,	social,	and	economic
change,	the	challenge	of	managing	emergencies	well	depends	on	effective	planning	and	foresight,	and	the	ability
to	connect	disparate	elements	of	the	emergency	response	into	coherent	strategies.
Keywords:	emergency	planning,	disaster	management,	recovery	planning,	reconstruction	planning,	crisis	management,	scenario
methodology,	disaster	response
What	Is	Emergency	Planning?
Emergency	planning	can	be	defined	as	the	process	of	preparing	systematically	for	future	contingencies,	including
major	incidents	and	disasters.	The	plan	is	usually	a	document,	shared	between	participants	and	stakeholders	that
specifies	tasks	and	responsibilities	adopted	in	the	multi-agency	response	to	the	emergency.	It	is	a	blueprint	for
managing	events	and,	as	such,	should	be	responsive	to	management	needs.	It	should	specify	the	lineaments	of
action,	collaboration,	command,	and	communication	during	a	civil	contingency	such	as	a	disaster	or	major	event;
in	other	words,	it	is	the	framework	for	emergency	response.	The	maintenance	of	public	safety,	limitation	of	damage,
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protection	of	the	vulnerable,	and	efficient	use	of	life-saving	resources	are	some	of	the	goals	of	the	plan.	Although
the	end	product	is	a	document,	emergency	planning	is	more	a	process	than	an	outcome,	especially	as	the	plan
itself	will	need	to	be	updated	over	time	as	circumstances	change.
The	Evolution	of	Emergency	and	Disaster	Planning
As	we	know	it	today,	emergency	planning	for	disasters	derives	from	civil	defense,	a	form	of	social	organization
designed	to	protect	civilians	against	armed	aggression.	The	latter	is	a	relatively	new	concept	that	in	its	modern
form	antedates	the	Second	World	War	by	only	a	very	brief	period.	Although	there	had	been	rudimentary	forms	of
organization	for	the	protection	of	non-combatants	in	previous	conflicts—for	example,	the	American	Civil	War	of	the
1860s—the	attack	on	Guernica,	in	the	Basque	country	of	Spain,	on	April	26,	1937,	by	German	aircraft	was	the	first
concerted	aerial	bombardment	(it	killed	1,654	civilians)	and	the	first	occasion	on	which	this	had	to	be	countered	by
properly	organized	measures	of	protection.	It	was	a	curtain	raiser	to	the	bombardments	of	the	early	1940s,	in
which	civil	defense	grew	enormously,	although	largely	without	the	benefits	of	fully	codified	plans.	During	this
period,	civil	defense	operatives	were	responsible	for	search	and	rescue,	safeguarding	and	accommodating	the
survivors	of	bombing	raids,	ensuring	public	safety	and	interdicting	areas	that	had	become	unsafe.
The	rather	temporary	apogee	reached	by	civil	defense	during	the	Second	World	War	was	subsequently	followed
by	reorganization	in	order	to	face	the	demands	of	the	Cold	War,	in	which	civilian	life	was	overshadowed	by	the
threat	of	a	thermo-nuclear	exchange	between	the	great	powers.	During	this	period,	plans	were	usually	kept	secret
and	were	predicated	on	the	assumption—highly	debatable—that	citizens	could	be	protected	and	given	shelter
against	nuclear	blasts	and	radioactive	fallout.
Détente	and	the	dissolution	of	the	Eastern	Bloc	led	to	the	gradual	end	of	the	era	of	civil	defense,	and	the	slow	rise
of	civil	protection,	which	is	designed	to	protect	people	against	the	effects	of	natural,	technological,	and	societal
hazards.	In	its	purest	form,	civil	defense	is	a	service	provided	by	the	central	state	and	directed	at	the	national	level
(i.e.,	it	is	fundamentally	“top-down”).	Civil	protection	is	a	decentralized	service	(i.e.,	“bottom-up”),	in	which	the
basis	of	organization	is	local,	which	usually	means	that	it	is	centered	on	the	municipal	level.
Emergency	planning	is	a	relatively	young	field	that	began	to	develop	systematically	in	the	1970s,	coincidentally
with	the	rise	of	civil	protection.	Initially,	it	did	so	largely	in	response	to	technological	hazards	such	as	toxic	spills
and	industrial	explosions.	Later,	there	was	an	increasing	emphasis	on	natural	disasters,	such	as	floods,	storms	and
earthquakes.
Academic	studies	of	disaster	have	a	somewhat	longer	history	than	does	civil	defense.	They	began	in	earnest	in	the
1920s	with	the	founding	of	a	sociological	approach	and,	in	parallel,	a	human	ecological	school	of	thought,	which
was	mainly	based	in	the	discipline	of	geography.	Development	was	slow	until	the	1950s,	when	fear	of	the
consequences	of	nuclear	war	gave	impetus	to	the	study	of	how	human	populations	behave	in	crisis	situations,
using	natural	disasters	as—rather	inadequate—analogues	for	a	thermo-nuclear	exchange.	Earlier,	geographers
had	started	to	study	the	human	dimensions	of	the	flood	problem,	notably	Gilbert	Fowler	White,	whose	thesis	on
adaptation	to	floods	was	published	in	1945.	Starting	in	the	1970s,	there	was	a	sustained	increase	in	studies	of
extreme	natural	phenomena,	which	gradually	came	to	grips	with	the	role	of	such	hazards	to	human	life	and
activities.	In	the	late	1970s,	a	school	of	thought	developed	that	suggested	that	vulnerability,	not	hazards,	is	the
real	key	to	understanding	disaster.	Despite	countless	demonstrations	of	this	axiom,	studies	of	vulnerability	have
lagged	behind	those	of	hazard,	the	other	principal	ingredient	in	the	making	of	disaster.	In	terms	of	how	academic
work	supports	emergency	planning,	this	means	that	there	has	been	a	plethora	of	studies	of	the	inputs	to	plans
(see,	for	example,	the	hazard	scenarios	in	the	section	“The	Use	of	Scenarios”),	but	a	paucity	of	studies	of	how
construct	and	use	emergency	plans.	On	this	basis,	emergency	planning	has	developed	in	a	somewhat	faltering
mode,	in	which	only	some	of	the	activities	associated	with	it	are	well	served	with	academic	inputs.
From	Incident	to	Catastrophe:	The	Range	of	Impacts
Most	civil	contingencies	are	small	enough	to	be	resolved	adequately	without	qualitative	changes	in	daily
management	procedures	or	quantitative	changes	in	the	availability	of	resources.	Hence,	this	article	will
concentrate	on	the	small	minority	of	emergencies,	usually	fewer	than	one	in	ten,	that	are	large	enough	to
substantially	disrupt	daily	life	and	normal	working	procedures.	There	is	no	consistently	reliable	way	of
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distinguishing	between	major	incidents,	disasters,	and	catastrophes	(but	see	Table	1	for	an	attempt	at	this).
Nevertheless,	all	of	these	events	have	in	common	the	fact	that	they	must	be	resolved	by	the	suspension	of	normal
procedures	and	substitution	of	emergency	ones.	In	the	latter,	the	imperatives,	tasks,	and	relationships	between
participants	are	sufficiently	exceptional	to	require	substantial	reorganization	and	working	methods	that	differ	from
those	employed	in	workaday	routines.
Emergency	response	involves	a	mixture	of	plans,	procedures,	and	improvization.	To	some	extent,	the	last	of	these
is	inevitable,	but	it	needs	to	be	limited	by	preparedness.	It	is	axiomatic	that	planning	and	procedures	should	not	be
improvised	during	an	emergency	when	they	should	have	been	thought	through	and	created	beforehand.	The
consequence	of	unwonted	improvisation	is	inefficiency	in	emergency	response,	which	may	have	serious	or	tragic
consequences.	A	degree	of	uniqueness	present	in	each	new	disaster	means	that	improvisation	cannot	be	avoided,
but	foresight	and	preparedness	can	constrain	it	to	a	necessary	minimum.	Moreover,	emergencies	are	always
occasions	for	learning,	and	a	significant	part	of	the	body	of	experience	on	which	plans	are	based	comes	from	the
mistakes,	inefficiencies,	and	improvisations	of	the	past.	Although	many	publications	have	the	phrase	“lessons
learned”	in	their	titles,	there	is	no	guarantee	that	a	lesson	will	indeed	be	learned.	If	that	does	indeed	happen,
measurable	positive	change	will	result	directly	from	the	lesson.	For	example,	lack	of	search-and-rescue	equipment
may	be	keenly	felt	in	structural	collapses	that	trap	people.	Hence,	probes,	props,	and	personal	protection
equipment	may	be	acquired	and	personnel	trained	in	how	to	use	them.
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Table	1.	Functional	Differences	between	Different	Sizes	of	Event
Incidents Major	incidents Disasters Catastrophes
Size	of
impact
Very
localized
Fully	or	partially
localized
Widespread	and	severe Extremely	large	in	the
physical	and	social
sphere
Size	of
response
Local
resources
used
Mainly	local
resources	used,
with	some	mutual
assistance	from
nearby	areas
Intergovernmental,
multi-agency,	multi-
jurisdictional	response
needed
Major	national	and
international	resources
and	coordination	are
required
Plans	and
procedures
activated
Standard
operating
procedures
used
Standard	operating
procedures	used;
emergency	plans
may	be	activated
Disaster	or	emergency
plans	activated
Disaster	or	emergency
plans	activated,	but
huge	challenges	may
overwhelm	them
Impact	on
response
resources
needed	for
response
Local
resources
will
probably
be
sufficient
Local	resources
and	some	outside
resources	needed
Extensive	damage	to
resources	in	disaster
area;	major	inter-
regional	transfers	of
resources
Local	and	regional
emergency	response
systems	paralyzed	and
in	need	of	much	outside
help
Involvement
of	public	in
response
Public
generally
not
involved	in
response
Public	largely	not
involved	in
response
Public	extensively
involved	in	response
Public	overwhelmingly
involved	in	response
Challenges
to	post-
event
recovery
No
significant
challenges
to
recovery
Few	challenges	to
recovery
processes
Major	challenges	to
recovery	from	disaster
Massive	challenges	and
significant	long-term
effects
Note.	Adapted	from	Tierney,	K.	(2008)	Hurricane	Katrina:	Catastrophic	impacts	and	alarming	lessons.	In
Quigley,	J.	M.,	&	Rosenthal,	L.	M.,	(Eds.).	Risking	House	and	Home:	Disasters,	Cities,	Public	Policy.	Berkeley,
CA:	Institute	of	Governmental	Studies,	Berkeley	Public	Policy	Press,	119–136.
There	is	a	fundamental	distinction	between	plans	and	procedures.	An	emergency	plan	should	not	have	to	teach	a
fireman	how	to	put	out	a	fire,	or	the	police	how	to	direct	traffic.	Instead,	it	should	articulate	and	integrate	the
procedures	to	be	used	in	a	major	emergency	by	assigning	responsibilities	and	ensuring	that	all	personnel	involved
in	complex	field	operations	understand	both	their	own	roles	and	those	of	other	participants.	Thus,	one	can	make	an
analogy	between	the	emergency	response	and	a	symphony.	Individual	instrumentalists	have	their	own	music	(i.e.,
the	procedures),	while	the	conductor	has	the	score	(i.e.,	the	plan).	The	common	objective	is	to	work	in	harmony.
Emergency	and	Disaster	Planning	as	a	Process
Above	all,	emergency	planning	should	be	a	process,	rather	than	a	product	or	outcome.	At	its	most	essential,	it	must
match	urgent	needs	to	available	resources,	and	do	so	in	a	timely	way	that	avoids	procrastination	and	delay.	Good
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emergency	plans	are	realistic	as	well	as	pragmatic.	For	instance,	there	is	no	point	in	making	arrangements	to	use
resources	that	are	not	available	and	are	not	likely	to	be	supplied	within	a	useful	time	frame.	Hence,	plans	should
take	account	of	both	the	limitations	and	the	capabilities	of	response.	At	this	point,	it	is	useful	to	introduce	the
concept	of	thresholds	(Table	2).	The	“bedrock”	level	of	emergency	planning	is	the	municipal	level	or	local	area.
This	is	because,	however	extensive	a	disaster	may	be,	the	theater	of	operations	for	managing	and	responding	to	it
is	always	local.	However,	if	local	resources	are	overwhelmed,	it	becomes	necessary	to	move	up	the	scale	of
response	to	inter-municipal,	regional,	national,	or	even	international	responses.	Each	of	these	is	associated	with	a
threshold	of	capability,	which	is	determined	by	the	availability	of	trained	personnel,	expertise,	equipment,	supplies,
communications,	vehicles,	and	buildings.	If	the	magnitude	of	the	emergency	exceeds	or	overwhelms	local
capabilities,	then	it	is	necessary	to	invoke	higher	levels	of	response.	However,	these	should	always	aim	to
reinforce,	not	supplant	the	local	ability	to	respond	to	the	emergency.	Once	the	outside	forces	have	departed,
inhabitants	of	the	local	area	will	be	left	on	their	own	to	manage	the	aftermath,	and	hence	they	need	to	be	in	good
shape	to	do	so.	Supplanting	local	resources,	decision-making	capabilities,	and	responses	will	only	leave	the	local
area	weaker	and	less	able	to	manage	the	longer-term	aftermath	and	any	emergencies	that	may	occur	in	the	future.
Table	2.	Thresholds	of	Capacity	in	Emergency	Response
Local	incident Local	response A
Threshold	of	local	capacity
Small	regional	incident Co-ordinated	local	response B
Threshold	of	intermunicipal	capacity
Major	regional	incident Intermunicipal	and	regional	response B
Threshold	of	regional	capacity
National	disaster Intermunicipal,	regional,	and	national	response C
Threshold	of	national	capacity
International	catastrophe Intermunicipal,	regional,	and	national	response,	with	international	assistance C
Note.	Simplified	version:	A	=	local	response,	B	=	regional	response,	C	=	national	response.
Emergency	planning	is	an	approximate	process	that,	in	many	instances,	is	little	more	than	codified	common	sense.
It	also	involves	a	collective	effort	and	is	thus	a	participatory	process.	In	order	to	avoid	sins	of	omission	or
commission,	it	requires	experience	and	training.	Regarding	the	former,	the	lack	of	a	plan	could	be	construed	as
negligence	in	the	face	of	a	demonstrable	need	to	protect	the	public.	Despite	this	assertion,	some	emergency
managers	have	argued	that	plans	tend	to	be	unnecessarily	restrictive	and	an	improvised	response	is	somehow
stronger	and	more	vital	than	one	conditioned	by	a	plan.	Military	strategists	from	Napoleon	Bonaparte	to	Dwight	D.
Eisenhower	have	noted	that,	when	preparing	for	war,	plans	have	little	value,	but	planning	is	essential.	This
underlines	the	importance	of	planning	as	a	process,	and	above	all	a	process	of	discovery.	In	this	sense,	whether
or	not	the	plan	works	during	an	emergency	is	of	secondary	importance:	more	vital	is	what	the	plan	tells	us	about
the	needs	of	preparedness	and	organization.	Moreover,	emergency	plans	generally	need	to	be	adapted	to
particular	emergency	situations,	which	further	underlines	the	view	that	planning	is	a	process,	and	an	ongoing	one.
At	this	point,	it	is	opportune	to	consider	what	sorts	of	events	and	situations	should	be	the	object	of	emergency
plans.
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For	What	Should	One	Plan?
Much	has	been	made	of	the	need	for	“all-hazards”	emergency	plans.	No	place	on	earth	is	entirely	free	from
hazard	and	risk.	Hence,	all	places	need	emergency	preparedness,	but	few	of	them	are	likely	to	be	subject	to	only
one	kind	of	hazard.	An	emergency	plan	must,	therefore,	be	adaptable	to	both	anticipated	and	unexpected
hazards.	For	many	years,	the	city	of	Florence,	in	Italy,	had	a	municipal	emergency	plan	that	only	addressed	the
contingency	of	flooding.	In	the	post-War	period,	the	largest	disaster	that	the	city	had	to	manage	was	the	major
flood	of	1966.	However,	during	the	lifetime	of	the	plan	(about	20	years),	only	limited	flooding	occurred,	and	the
biggest	emergencies	were	an	air	crash	and	a	terrorist	bomb.	Likewise,	on	September	11,	2001,	emergency
coordinators	in	Washington,	DC	had	to	manage	the	response	to	the	aircraft	that	crashed	into	the	Pentagon	(and
the	ensuing	city-wide	chaos)	by	adapting	and	using	a	plan	made	specifically	to	deal	with	the	so-called	“millennium
bug,”	or	in	other	words	anticipated	widespread	computer	failure.	A	good	emergency	plan	makes	provision	for
managing	all	the	known	and	anticipated	hazards	(the	seasonal	and	recurrent	events),	while	at	the	same	time
offering	generic	protocols	to	manage	the	unanticipated	ones.
One	issue	that	has	long	perturbed	emergency	planners	is	the	size	of	event	for	which	plans	should	be	configured.	If
one	assumes	that	recurrent	hazards	are	in	a	steady	state,	then	somewhere	there	should	be	a	“happy	medium,”	in
which	an	extreme	event	is	neither	too	large	and	infrequent	to	be	expected	to	occur	during	the	life	of	the	plan,	nor
too	small	and	frequent	to	need	significant	emergency	provisions.	The	first	problem	with	this	arrangement	is	that,
especially	regarding	natural	hazards,	there	are	few	cases	in	which	an	adequate	magnitude-frequency	relationship
has	been	established.	Hence,	the	likelihood	of	an	extreme	event	of	a	given	size	may	be	conjectural,	rather	than
scientifically	determined.	The	second	problem	is	that	the	time	series	of	events	may	be	non-stationary.	For	example,
there	is	overwhelming	scientific	consensus	on	the	occurrence	of	climate	change,	and	few	scientists	now	doubt	the
speed	at	which	it	is	occurring.	Damage	tends	to	be	a	non-linear	function	of	extreme	meteorological	events,	in	the
sense	that	small	increases	in,	for	example,	wind	speed	lead	to	disproportionately	large	increases	in	wind	damage
to	structures.	The	same	may	be	true	of	casualties,	although	here	the	relationship	is	complicated	by	factors	of
perception	and	behavior	in	people’s	reaction	to	immediate	risk.
It	is	often	said	that	“we	plan	for	the	last	event,	not	the	next	one.”	There	is	indeed	a	tendency	to	base	assumptions
about	the	size	and	characteristics	of	each	event	that	will	be	faced	in	the	future	on	the	historical	record	of	such
events	in	the	past,	particularly	the	recent	past.	What	if	the	next	event	is	entirely	out	of	character?	The	magnitude	9
earthquake	that	occurred	off	the	east	coast	of	Japan	in	March	2011	caused	a	tsunami	that	was	considerably	higher
than	those	that	most	parts	of	the	coast	had	prepared	for	(Figure	1).	People	were	washed	off	refuge	mounds,	and
the	Fukushima	Da’ichi	nuclear	plant	was	overrun	with	water,	leading	to	meltdown.	The	plant	was	protected	against
a	tsunami	that	would	have	resulted	from	an	offshore	earthquake	up	to	magnitude	7.5.	Much	emergency
preparedness	against	riverine	flooding	is	based	on	the	notion	of	the	100-year	flood,	and	the	depths	and
geographical	areas	that	such	an	event	would	inundate.	Leaving	aside	the	question	of	whether	estimates	of	the
magnitude	of	a	flood	with	an	approximate	recurrence	interval	of	once	in	a	century	are	accurate,	there	is	no	hard-
and-fast	operational	reason	why	the	100-year	flood	should	be	more	significant	or	damaging	than	any	other.
However,	it	is	legitimate	to	discuss	the	size	of	flood	with	a	1%,	or	once	in	a	century,	probability	of	occurring	in	any
given	year,	whether	or	not	that	should	be	the	flood	for	which	protection	measures	are	designed.	In	the	final
analysis,	emergency	planning	has	to	be	realistic.	This	means	that	it	can	only	be	applied	to	resources	that	actually
exist	or	can	be	obtained	within	an	appropriately	brief	time	frame.	On	that	basis,	the	question	of	what	size	of	event
to	prepare	for	is	more	a	policy	issue	than	a	planning	one.	In	synthesis,	the	problem	of	how	to	prepare	for
exceptionally	large	events	remains	unresolved,	both	in	terms	of	what	is	necessary	and	what	is	feasible.
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Figure	1. 	The	remains	of	the	emergency	management	center	at	Shizugawa,	on	the	northeast	coast	of
Japan.	Here,	the	tsunami	of	March	11,	2011	was	higher	than	the	building.	Personnel	were	drowned	while
they	struggled	to	broadcast	warnings,	although	a	few	of	them	survived	by	climbing	up	the	radio	mast	on
top	of	the	building.	The	size	of	the	tsunami	underlines	the	difficulty	of	estimating	the	magnitude	of	events
when	planning	for	them.
Anatomy	of	an	Emergency	Plan
Emergency	and	disaster	planning	is	a	relatively	new	field,	and	one	that	is	evolving	rapidly,	driven	by	intensifying
hazards,	burgeoning	vulnerabilities,	and	emerging	risks.	Hence,	there	is	no	established	formula	according	to	which
a	plan	should	be	prepared.	Nevertheless,	there	are	canons	and	practices	that	must	be	respected.	As	noted	above,
a	plan	should	focus	on	ensuring	that	a	good	response	to	threats,	emergencies,	and	recovery	processes	occurs	at
the	local	level.
Emergency	Planning	and	Emergency	Management
The	primary	resource	is	information,	and	hence	everything	possible	should	be	done	to	ensure	that	flows	of	vital
data	and	communications	are	unrestricted	and	properly	focussed	on	essential	needs.	Emergency	management,	as
supported	by	prior	and	on-going	planning,	should	ensure	that	organizations	can	work	together	effectively	under
unfamiliar	circumstances,	possibly	including	organizations	that	have	no	formal	relations	under	normal,	non-
emergency	circumstances.	The	plan	should	ensure	that	every	participant	in	the	response	to	an	emergency	has	a
role,	and	that	all	anticipated	tasks	are	covered	such	that	the	risk	of	hiatuses	or	disputes	about	responsibilities	is
minimized.
One	way	to	demonstrate	the	connection	between	emergency	planning	and	emergency	management	is	through	the
provisions	to	manage	information.	Emergency	communication	needs	to	be	sustained,	flexible,	and	clear.	Decisions
and	communications	need	to	be	recorded.	The	emergency	planner	can	help	this	process	by	ensuring	that	the
technological	means	of	communication	are	present	and	are	robust	in	the	face	of	potential	failure,	the	protocols	for
sending	messages	are	established,	and	the	priorities	for	communication	are	known	to	participants.
Emergency	Planning	and	Urban	and	Regional	Planning
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The	process	of	formulating	an	emergency	plan	is	similar,	and	parallel,	to	urban	and	regional	planning.	Sadly,	the
two	disciplines	rarely	enjoy	sufficient	connection	and	interchange.	This	is	unfortunate,	because	they	have	much	in
common.	In	emergency	planning,	as	in	urban	and	regional	planning,	perhaps	70%	of	the	problem	to	be	solved	is
spatial	(i.e.,	geographical)	in	nature.	The	answer	to	the	question	“what	is	where?”	is	at	the	root	of	many	provisions
designed	to	manage	emergency	situations.	Like	urban	and	regional	planners,	emergency	planners	need	to	study
the	geography,	demography,	economics,	social	relations,	and	culture	of	the	area	that	forms	the	jurisdiction	of	the
plan.	This	is	essential	if	the	plan	is	to	respond	well	to	local	hazards	and	vulnerabilities	and	be	compatible	with	local
perceptions,	traditions,	activities,	and	expectations.	Other	than	that,	the	five	stages	of	emergency	planning	are
research,	writing,	publicity,	operations,	and	revision.	Research	will	ensure	an	adequate	basis	of	knowledge	of
hazards,	vulnerabilities,	local	characteristics,	and	capacities.	Writing	will	create	the	plan,	and	its	appendices	and
abbreviated	aides	memoires.	Publicity	and	training	will	make	it	known	to	the	users	and	the	organizations	they
represent,	and	operations	will	test	elements	of	the	plan	in	terms	of	feasibility,	appropriateness,	and	efficiency.
Finally,	the	plan	should	be	a	living	document;	hence,	it	will	need	to	be	updated	frequently	and	consistently	to	take
account	of	changes	and	new	knowledge.
The	essence	of	emergency	and	disaster	management	is	its	capacity	to	tackle	pressing	needs	with	maximum
efficiency	and	celerity	but	with	scarce	resources	and	in	the	absence	of	much	necessary	information.	Before	the
event,	the	plan	must	make	assumptions	about	what	is	needed	during	the	event.	Those	assumptions	need	to	be
considered	within	the	compass	of	what	is	feasible	with	the	available	human	and	technical	resources.	One	reason
why	the	plan	must	constantly	be	updated	is	that	one	assumes	there	will	be	a	program	of	continuous	improvement
in	the	resources,	and	one	trusts	that	it	will	take	place	in	the	light	of	the	evolving	body	of	knowledge	of	hazards	and
the	needs	that	they	provoke.
Plans	and	Relevant	Legislation
Emergency	plans	need	to	be	written	in	the	light	of	the	prevailing	legislation,	as	well	as	the	provisions	it	makes	for
tackling	major	incidents	and	disasters.	In	many	countries,	legislation	exists	at	both	the	national	level	and	the	level
of	regions,	states,	provinces,	departments,	counties,	or	prefectures—what	is	known	as	the	intermediate	tier	of
government.	In	the	United	States,	the	main	federal	law	is	the	Robert	T.	Stafford	Disaster	Relief	and	Emergency
Assistance	Act	(the	Stafford	Act),	which	has	evolved	since	1974.	In	India,	another	federal	republic,	the	national	law
was	formulated	in	2005.	In	the	United	Kingdom,	the	Civil	Contingencies	Act	dates	from	2004;	and	in	Italy,	a	law
passed	in	1992	establishes	the	national	civil	protection	system.	In	most	cases,	the	basic	law	assigns
responsibilities	for	the	principal	tasks	to	be	accomplished	in	national	emergency	situations.	There	may	be	a	legal
obligation	to	draw	up	emergency	plans,	but	it	seldom,	if	ever,	extends	to	the	quality	and	compatibility	of	such
plans.
Usually,	compliance	with	legislation	is	simply	a	matter	of	comparative	reading,	or	in	other	words	ensuring	that	there
are	no	glaring	incompatibilities.	The	compliance	may	also	have	to	extend	to	other	kinds	of	legislation,	such	as	that
pertaining	to	health	and	safety	at	work,	environmental	protection,	industrial	safety,	national	security,	and	the
division	of	responsibilities	between	different	tiers	of	government.	Once	again,	compliance	can	usually	be	assured
by	comparative	reading,	although	there	may	be	cases	in	which	legal	requirements	conflict	with	one	another,	for
example	between	environmental	legislation	and	laws	about	resource	utilization.
Multi-Agency	Planning
One	source	of	complexity	in	emergency	planning	is	the	need	to	integrate	several	dimensions	into	the	programmed
emergency	response.	Hierarchical	divisions	refer	to	the	tiers	of	government—from	national,	through	regional,	to
local.	Geographical	divisions	indicate	the	spatial	jurisdictions	to	which	plans	refer,	and	possibly	also	to	questions
of	mutual	assistance.	Organizational	divisions	refer	to	the	different	agencies	that	participate	in	emergency
responses,	such	as	the	“blue	light”	services	(police,	fire,	and	ambulance),	technical	groups,	and	volunteer
organizations.	Lastly,	functional	divisions	indicate	the	different	fields	involved,	such	as	government,	health	care,
public	order,	public	works,	economy	and	employment,	finance,	and	the	private	sector	(Figure	2).	The	emergency
plan	is	one	contribution	to	the	process	of	articulating	a	system	of	response	to	civil	contingencies,	in	which	an
optimum	balance	is	sought	between	integrating	these	forces	and	allowing	them	a	degree	of	autonomy	and	freedom
of	action.
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Figure	2. 	The	different	dimensions	of	division	and	integration	in	emergency	planning	and	management.
The	Plan	and	Warning	Processes
Whether	natural	or	anthropogenic,	hazards	vary	considerably	in	their	predictability	and	the	amount	of	lead	time,	if
any,	for	preparations	to	take	place.	Nevertheless,	warning	and	associated	responses	are	two	vital	elements	of
most	emergency	plans.	Short-term	warning	must	be	distinguished	from	the	longer-term	predictability	of	hazards.
Earthquakes,	for	instance,	are	mostly	predictable	in	terms	of	the	basic	tenets	of	magnitude,	frequency,	and
location,	but	not	with	regard	to	impending	shocks	in	a	short	time	window,	such	as	48	hours.	In	contrast,	with
adequate	monitoring	using	Doppler	radar,	warnings	can	be	issued	for	tornadoes	with	lead	times	of	20–120	minutes,
and	remote	sensing	together	with	digital	modelling	can	give	a	reliable	picture	of	a	hurricane	track	many	hours
before	the	storm	makes	landfall.
Warnings	have	three	essential	components:	scientific	and	technical,	administrative,	and	social	(Figure	3).	The
absence	or	ineffectiveness	of	any	of	them	renders	the	warning	system	inoperable.	Scientific	information	on	an
impending	hazard	must	be	transformed	into	a	message	to	be	acted	upon,	and	a	decision	must	be	taken	to	warn
affected	people,	who	must	then	hear	and	react	appropriately	to	the	warning.	The	emergency	plan	should
determine	how	to	transform	information	on	hazards	to	advice	or	orders	on	how	to	react.	It	should	prescribe	the
means	of	disseminating	the	message	and	monitoring	the	social	reaction	to	it.	In	practical	terms,	evacuation	or
sheltering	is	usually	the	most	appropriate	reaction	to	warning	and	the	best	way	of	moving	people	out	of	harm’s
way.	However,	the	means	and	the	routes	to	evacuate	people	must	be	available	(or	there	must	be	appropriate,	safe
locations	for	in	situ	or	vertical	evacuation).	Horizontal	evacuation	may	require	reception	centers	with	staff,
bedding,	methods	of	procuring,	preparing,	and	distributing	food,	and	so	on.
Click	to	view	larger
Figure	3. 	The	components	of	the	warning	process.
The	Role	of	Information	and	Communications	Technology
Modern	emergency	responses	are	heavily	reliant	on	information	and	communications	technology	(ICT).	Many
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algorithms	have	been	written	to	assist	emergency	operations,	for	example,	by	providing	an	“expert	system”	that
aids	decision	making,	or	by	helping	record	decisions	as	they	are	made.	For	example,	terrestrial	trunked	radio
(TETRA)	systems	can	be	used	to	provide	flexible	communications	between	different	services	and	groups	of
responders.	Emergency	plans	should	reflect	these	innovations	and	the	opportunities	they	bring	for	sharing
information	and	developing	a	synoptic	picture	of	a	rapidly	evolving	situation	on	the	ground.	Plans	can	include	or
refer	to	protocols	for	messaging	and	communications,	and	thus	help	clarify	and	standardize	them.
The	emergency	plan	should	either	prescribe	or	describe	the	structure	of	command	and	management	to	be	utilized
in	the	case	of	a	disaster	or	major	incident.	Modern	information	technology	has	tended	to	flatten	the	chain	of
command	and	has	given	rise	to	a	more	collaborative	form	of	management,	which	lessens	the	reliance	on	militaristic
principles	of	“command	and	control.”	Nevertheless,	there	will	need	to	be	a	web	of	formal	relationships	between
different	organizations	and	units	that	participate	in	the	response	to	disaster.	The	focal	point	of	many	of	these	is	the
emergency	operations	center	(EOC),	which	is	usually	also	the	“natural	home”	for	an	emergency	plan,	or	in	other
words,	the	place	where	it	is	most	appropriate	to	draw	up	and	maintain	such	an	instrument.	The	EOC	needs	to	be	a
center	of	communications	and	management,	one	that	has	functional	autonomy	(e.g.,	its	own	electrical	generator
and	fuel	stocks).
In	a	fully	functional	civil	protection	system,	emergency	resource	hubs	such	as	EOCs	usually	operate	as	a	nested
hierarchy.	They	will	function	within	the	compass	of	plans	made	at	different	levels	of	government	and	by	different
jurisdictions.	It	follows	that	the	emergency	plans	themselves	will	need	to	ensure	interoperability	and	a	rational
division	of	responsibilities,	so	that	all	tasks	can	be	covered	in	emergencies	of	different	sizes.	Once	again,	this
involves	comparative	reading	of	plans	and,	preferably,	some	national	guidelines	for	ensuring	compatibility.
Specialized	Emergency	Planning
A	further	issue	is	the	need	for	emergency	planning	in	different	sectors.	The	United	Kingdom’s	Civil	Contingencies
Act	of	2004	obliges	the	providers	of	fundamental	services	in	the	private	sector	to	draw	up	emergency	plans.	This	is
necessary,	as	much	of	the	nation’s	critical	infrastructure	is	run	by	private-sector	operators.	Industrial	firms	also
need	plans,	so	that	they	can	cope	with	technological	failures	and	their	consequences,	and	commercial	companies
need	to	ensure	business	continuity.	Emergency	plans	are	needed	in	both	hospitals	and	the	health	systems	of
which	they	form	a	part.	Hospital	plans	should	state	the	preparations	needed	for	internal	and	external	emergencies.
The	former	refers	to	contingencies	such	as	fire,	structural	collapse,	or	contamination,	and	the	latter	mainly	deals
with	the	need	to	cope	with	mass	casualty	influxes.	In	addition,	public	transport	services	need	emergency	plans	to
guarantee	the	movement	of	people	and	goods	during	a	crisis	and	its	aftermath.	For	example,	the	plans	for	an
airport	should	be	integrated	with	those	of	the	city	and	region	in	which	it	is	situated.	Finally,	there	is	an	increasing
realization	that	emergency	plans	are	needed	to	protect	cultural	heritage,	which	includes	a	huge	variety	of	sites
and	artefacts,	many	of	which	have	highly	specialized	conservation	requirements.	Loss	of	cultural	heritage	in
disasters	such	as	floods	and	earthquakes	can	deal	a	catastrophic	blow	to	the	intellectual	and	artistic	life	of	a
country	by	obliterating	or	damaging	an	irreplaceable	legacy.
Among	specialized	emergency	plans,	it	is	worth	singling	out	those	required	for	educational	institutions.	The
collapse	of	thousands	of	schools	in	earthquakes	in	Pakistan	(2005)	and	China	(2008),	and	the	consequential	loss	of
thousands	of	young	lives,	underlines	the	importance	of	providing	a	safe	education	to	pupils	and	students.	This	is	a
moral	requirement,	as	well	as	one	that	all	parents	would	support.	Despite	this,	emergency	planning	for	schools
tends	to	be	neglected	and	underrated.	It	is	not	merely	a	question	of	evacuation.	Plans	need	to	assess	hazards	and
design	strategies	to	manage	situations	safely.	As	in	other	forms	of	emergency	planning,	scenarios	are	needed.	In
one	exemplary	case,	a	school	has	developed	different	strategies	to	manage	the	response	to	floods	and
earthquakes,	both	of	which	threaten	it.	As	teachers	are	in	loco	parentis	for	their	young	charges,	there	is	a
requirement	to	ensure	that	school	students	are	looked	after	in	safety	throughout	an	emergency.	Schools	and	other
educational	institutions	have	been	the	target	of	natural	hazards	such	as	earthquakes,	tornadoes,	landslides,
floods,	and	snowstorms;	terrorism,	such	as	marauding	gunmen;	and	structural	collapse	and	fire.	When	many
young	lives	are	lost	the	sense	of	moral	inadequacy	can	be	universal,	but	not	enough	has	been	done	to	ensure	that
emergency	planning	for	schools	is	transformed	into	universal	practical	measures	to	protect	children	and	young
adults.
The	art	of	emergency	planning	involves	“anticipating	the	unexpected.”	For	example,	one	important	aspect	that	is
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often	overlooked	is	veterinary	planning.	This	has	three	main	categories:	domestic,	farm,	and	wild	animals.	Many
people	will	not	evacuate	in	the	face	of	a	major	threat	unless	they	can	take	their	pets	with	them,	and	hence,
provision	needs	to	be	made	to	accommodate	domestic	animals.	In	pastoral	areas,	farm	economies	are	dependent
on	the	care	and	welfare	of	animals,	which	can	be	trapped	and	drowned	by	floods,	frozen	by	blizzards,	affected	by
epizootic	diseases,	or	deprived	of	feedstock.	Planning	to	manage	wild	animals	mainly	refers	to	threats	to	the	human
population	posed	by	ecological	disruption	in	disasters	due,	for	example,	to	the	migration	of	dangerous	reptiles	or
the	possible	spread	of	rabies.	Another	form	of	planning	that	is	roundly	neglected	is	that	associated	with	prison
populations.	In	floods,	storms,	and	earthquakes,	these	individuals	have	been	either	confined	to	dangerous
localities	or	released	indiscriminately	into	the	community.	Prisoners	have	human	rights,	including	the	right	to
custodial	safety,	but	to	release	hardened	criminals	into	society	may	pose	risks	to	the	general	population.	Finally,
during	the	difficult	circumstances	engendered	by	disaster,	pharmaceutical	emergency	planning	is	needed	in	order
to	ensure	continuity	of	medication	for	patients	who	depend	on	medical	drugs.
Using	the	Plan	in	an	Emergency
One	ingredient	of	most	emergency	plans	is	a	stipulation	of	the	alert	and	call-up	procedures	for	personnel.	These
need	to	be	integrated	with	the	potential	phases	of	warning,	which	at	their	simplest	are	hazard	watch	(impact	is
possible	or	likely)	and	hazard	warning	(impact	is	highly	likely	or	certain).	A	part	of	the	plan	may	be	dedicated	to	the
preparations	to	be	made	before	impact,	if	time	is	likely	to	be	available	to	carry	them	out.	Examples	include	putting
up	mobile	flood	defenses,	marshalling	and	readying	vehicles	and	equipment,	and	testing	and	readying	the	means
of	field	communication.	The	impact	phase	of	a	disaster	is	usually	a	period,	more	or	less	brief,	characterized	by
dynamic	evolution	and	acute	shortage	of	information.	One	of	the	first	needs	is	for	an	assessment	that	determines
whether	to	move	into	emergency	mode.	The	declaration	of	a	state	of	emergency	allows	the	formal	abandonment	of
normal	working	procedures	and	the	immediate	adoption	of	those	that	pertain	strictly	to	the	disaster.	Hospital	beds
will	be	cleared,	leave	will	be	cancelled,	personnel	will	move	to	predetermined	locations,	lines	of	communication	will
be	opened,	and	so	on.	The	emergency	phase	may	continue	for	hours	or	days,	and	in	exceptional	cases	for	weeks.
However,	it	should	end	with	a	formal	declaration	of	“stand-down,”	as	prescribed	in	the	plan,	which	releases
personnel	for	leave	and	ordinary	duties.
Testing	and	Revising	the	Plan
In	most	parts	of	the	world,	major	incidents	and	disasters	are,	thankfully,	rare,	although	they	may	be	an	ever-
present	threat.	The	emergency	plan	therefore	needs	to	be	tested	under	hypothetical	conditions.	Exercises	and
drills	can	be	divided	into	table-top,	command	post,	and	field-based	simulations.	The	last	category	is	clearly	the
most	onerous,	and	it	may	require	up	to	six	months	of	meticulous	planning.	Generally,	none	of	these	methods	is
capable	of	testing	the	whole	plan,	and	so	elements	of	it	must	be	selected	for	verification	by	simulation.	One
common	element	is	the	ability	of	different	organizations	to	work	together	under	specific,	unfamiliar	circumstances;
for	example,	the	ability	of	different	medical	response	organizations	to	set	up	and	run	a	field	hospital	together.
Exercises	need	to	be	designed	with	clear,	well	formulated	objectives,	and	the	progress	of	the	simulation	needs	to
be	carefully	monitored	so	that	any	need	for	improvements	can	be	detected	and	communicated	to	participants	in
post-exercise	debriefings	and	reports.	All	of	this	needs	to	be	done	in	an	atmosphere	of	constructive	support,	and
certainly	not	recrimination,	as	the	aim	is	not	to	examine	but	to	help	participants	improve	their	performance	during
future	emergencies.	Simulations	need	to	be	treated	as	learning	processes,	from	which	it	may	be	possible	to	derive
improvements	to	the	plan.	One	hopes	that	in	real	emergencies	it	will	also	be	possible	to	learn	lessons	and	improve
the	emergency	plan	on	the	basis	of	real	experience.	One	such	lesson	is	that	personal	familiarity	with	other
participants	in	emergency	operations	greatly	improves	the	ability	to	work	together.	This	underlines	the	value	of
emergency	simulations	and	drills.
The	emergency	plan	should	be	a	living	document.	In	fact,	there	is	nothing	worse	than	the	“paper	plan	syndrome”—
or	its	modern	digital	equivalent—in	which	the	plan	is	formulated	and	relegated	to	a	desk	drawer	(or	a	hard	drive)
without	being	used	or	updated.	Such	plans	can	do	more	harm	than	good	when	they	are	eventually	put	to	the	test
by	a	crisis.	As	time	wears	on,	both	small	and	large	changes	will	occur.	Hence	the	plan	should	include	provisions,
not	only	for	disseminating	it	and	training	its	users,	but	also	for	a	process	of	constant	updating,	with	checks	at
regular	intervals,	perhaps	every	six	months.
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The	next	section	will	discuss	the	contents	of	emergency	plans	in	more	detail.
The	Use	of	Scenarios
Hitherto	in	this	entry,	emergency	plans	have	been	viewed	as	if	they	consist	of	nothing	but	collections	of	generic
provisions	for	managing	a	notional	crisis.	These	are	necessary,	in	that	the	plan	may	need	to	be	adaptable	to
unexpected	crises.	However,	many—perhaps	most—emergencies	are	predictable	events,	at	least	in	terms	of	what
is	likely	to	happen.	Not	all	disasters	are	cyclical	events	(those	of	seasonal	meteorological	origin	are	the	closest	to
this),	but	many	are	recurrent	according	to	established	magnitude-frequency	relationships,	although,	as	noted,
these	may	be	imperfectly	known.	Over	the	last	30	years	or	so,	knowledge	of	natural	hazards	has	increased
spectacularly.	The	threats,	probabilities,	time	sequences,	and	effects	of	floods,	landslides,	storms,	earthquakes,
volcanic	eruptions,	and	so	on,	are	now	much	better	understood	than	was	the	case	half	a	century	ago.
Unfortunately,	despite	calls	in	the	early	1980s	to	make	it	a	central	issue,	understanding	of	vulnerability	to	natural
hazards	has	not	evolved	at	the	same	pace.	In	most	places,	vulnerability,	not	hazard,	is	the	key	to	disaster
potential;	this	is	unfortunate	and	needs	immediate	improvements	in	research.	Nevertheless,	in	places	where
hazards	are	recurrent,	emergency	planning	against	them	should	be	based	on	scenarios.	These	will	enable	urgent
needs	to	be	foreseen	and	situations	to	be	anticipated	by	providing	the	right	resources	in	the	right	place	and	at	the
right	time.	Hence,	scenarios	should	be	a	vital	ingredient	of	emergency	plans.
A	scenario	is	a	postulated	sequence	or	development	of	events.	Scenarios	can	be	used	to	reconstruct	past
disasters,	where	the	evolution	of	these	is	incompletely	known.	However,	the	main	use	in	emergency	planning	is	to
explore	possible	future	events	and	outcomes.	A	scenario	should	not	be	a	rigid	prediction	of	future	developments.	It
is	instead	an	exploratory	tool.	In	most	scenarios,	there	is	not	one	outcome	of	developments,	there	is	instead	a
range	of	outcomes.	To	establish	this	is	to	think	creatively	about	the	future.
Typically,	an	emergency	planning	scenario	will	be	based	on	a	“reference	event,”	or	possibly	more	than	one	event.
This	will	be	a	disaster	that	in	the	past	affected	the	area	covered	by	the	plan,	and	which	it	is	deemed	may	be
repeated	in	the	future.	Efforts	must	be	made	to	assemble	a	plausible	set	of	hazard	data	that	represent	the	range	of
possibilities	for	the	physical	impact:	for	example,	the	wind	speed,	precipitation,	and	track	of	a	storm,	or	the
magnitude	and	epicentral	location	of	an	earthquake.	The	nature	of	the	built	environment,	the	economy,
demography,	and	social	characteristics	of	the	area,	and	the	assets	at	risk	will	all	have	changed	since	the
reference	event.	Modern	conditions	must	be	added	to	the	scenario.	This	then	needs	to	be	developed	as	a	temporal
sequence	of	evolution	in	terms	of	hazard	occurrence,	the	impact	on	vulnerable	people	and	assets,	and	the
response	of	emergency	services	(Figure	4).	Because	aggregate	patterns	of	human	behavior	change	during	the
day,	the	week,	and	possibly	also	the	year,	several	runs	of	the	scenario	may	be	needed.	For	example,	an
earthquake	scenario	may	use	the	last	seismic	disaster	as	its	reference	event,	but	the	future	projection	may	need	to
be	made	for	an	earthquake	that	occurs	during	the	night,	on	a	working	day,	and	on	a	holiday,	as	there	will	be
different	effects	on	people	and	the	buildings	and	structures	that	they	use.
Click	to	view	larger
Figure	4. 	Scenario	methodology	in	emergency	planning.
It	is	opportune	to	use	a	simple	systems	theory	methodology	to	construct	the	scenario.	The	inputs	are	the	reference
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event	and	accompanying	conditions	(social,	environmental,	economic,	etc.).	The	output	is	the	outcome	of	the
disaster	and	its	management.	The	throughputs	and	transformations	are	the	evolution	of	the	scenario	over	time.
One	can,	if	necessary,	construct	subsystems	that	embrace,	for	example,	the	health	system	response	to	the
disaster,	or	the	impact	on	local	civil	aviation.	The	point	of	using	scenarios	in	emergency	planning	is	to	be	able	to
explore	and	anticipate	needs	generated	by	predictable	future	disasters.	Hence,	the	scenario	should	produce	a
range	of	possible	outcomes	and	should	be	used	as	an	exploratory	tool.	It	should	be	used	in	conjunction	with	an
audit	of	emergency	resources	designed	to	answer	the	question	of	whether	they	are	sufficient	and	appropriate	to
match	the	anticipated	needs.
Emergency	planners	need	not	be	frightened	of	the	unknown.	There	has	been	much	debate	on	the	existence	of	so-
called	“black	swans,”	or	unanticipated	events.	These	may	be	all	very	well	in	economics,	but	in	disaster
management	the	black	swan	has	become	extinct,	and	its	ecological	niche	has	been	occupied	by	the	red	herring—
or	thus	is	the	present	author’s	opinion.	This	means	that	there	is	very	little	in	future	events	that	will	not	have
occurred	in	some	form	in	the	past.	The	scale	and	configuration	may	be	different,	but	the	components	are	present
in	the	historical	record.	However,	this	should	not	be	interpreted	as	a	call	to	look	resolutely	backwards.	Scenario
builders	will	require	considerable	skill	if	they	are	to	make	a	reliable	assessment	of	the	magnitude	and
consequences	of	future	events.	This	underlines	the	value	of	scenario	methodology	as	an	exploratory	tool,	in	which
known	regularities	and	established	evidence	are	projected	into	a	hypothetical	future	space	and	allowed	to	develop
in	an	“envelope”	of	possible	developments.
The	Uses	and	Abuses	of	Emergency	Plans
One	way	of	extending	the	emergency	plan	into	the	crisis	phase,	and	adapting	it	to	rapidly	changing	needs,	is	to
continue	the	planning	process	during	the	emergency	(Figure	5).	Strategic	planning	is	essentially	about	finding
resources	and	ensuring	that	the	assemblage	of	response	units,	plans,	and	initiatives	is	generally	going	in	the	right
direction,	so	that	it	will	meet	the	needs	of	the	population	affected	by	disaster.	Tactical	planning	is	largely	about
apportioning	resources	so	that	they	can	be	used	on	the	ground	by	operational	units.	Operational	planning	is	about
assigning	tasks,	constituting	task	forces,	and	monitoring	the	evolution	of	the	situation	so	that	tasks	are	set	and
accomplished.	At	all	three	levels,	the	permanent	emergency	plan	is	a	backdrop	to	activities.	It	should	neither	be
slavishly	and	rigidly	followed	nor	ignored.	One	hopes	that	it	will	ensure	that	fundamental	tasks	are	apportioned,
responsibilities	are	clear,	and	appropriate	action	is	stimulated.
Click	to	view	larger
Figure	5. 	The	dynamic	hierarchy	of	emergency	plans.
Emergency	planning	should	be	a	co-operative	effort	in	which	the	users	and	beneficiaries	of	the	plan	are
stakeholders	who	have	an	interest	in	ensuring	that	the	plan	works	well.	It	is	also	important	to	create	and	maintain
interoperability,	so	that	emergencies	that	require	large-scale	responses	do	not	lead	to	chaos	and	to	groups	of
people	working	at	cross	purposes.
A	Variety	of	Administrative	and	Political	Contexts
One	example	of	success	in	ensuring	co-operation	is	the	introduction	and	diffusion	of	the	incident	command	system
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(ICS)	in	the	United	States	since	1970,	when	it	was	first	devised	as	a	measure	to	combat	wildfire	in	California.	ICS	is	a
modular	system	that	is	usually	implemented	at	the	site	of	an	incident	and	can	be	aggregated	to	higher	levels.	It	has
been	codified	by	the	U.S.	Federal	Emergency	Management	Agency	and	is	available	online	at	National	Incident
Management	System,	which	ensures	a	degree	of	interoperability	among	many	different	forces.	This	is	highly
necessary,	as	in	a	major	incident	or	disaster,	scores	of	agencies	and	organizations	may	work	together—not	at
cross	purposes,	one	hopes!
In	Europe,	interoperability	is	gaining	ground,	but	the	diversity	of	legal	and	administrative	systems	among	the	states
of	Europe,	and	the	different	histories	of	civil	protection	that	they	enjoy,	means	that	the	process	is	slow	and
complex.	During	the	response	to	the	earthquake	in	Haiti	on	January	2010,	field	hospitals	sent	from	European
countries	lacked	interoperability	of	equipment	and	procedures,	because	they	were	functioning	according	to
different,	not	entirely	compatible,	standards.	Thus,	they	experienced	difficulty	in	supporting	each	other’s	work.
One	absorbing	question	about	disaster	response	is	the	relationship	between	emergency	planners	and	emergency
or	disaster	managers.	In	some	countries	(for	example,	Italy),	they	are	one	and	the	same,	which	makes	sense,	in
that	the	plan	needs	to	be	prepared	by	people	who	understand	the	dynamics	of	managing	an	emergency.	In	other
countries,	such	as	the	United	Kingdom,	the	planners	and	the	managers	tend	to	be	separate	figures.	In	traditional
systems,	the	emergency	manager	is	a	commander,	much	as	military	officers	command	their	battalions.	In	more
modern,	evolved	systems	the	manager	is	much	more	of	a	coordinator,	a	person	who	manages	resources	and
ensures	that	autonomous	work	by	experts	and	task	forces	is	able	to	go	ahead	in	a	co-operative	mode.	Over	the
years,	as	emergency	response	has	become	more	professional,	the	need	for	command	has	diminished.	This	does
not	reduce	the	need	to	apportion	and	assume	responsibility,	but	it	does	make	a	subtle	and	profound	shift	in	the
way	that	that	occurs.	Modern	emergency	planning	is	less	about	specifying	chains	of	command	and	more	about
ensuring	a	“joined	up,”	coordinated,	approach	that	covers	all	essential	tasks	and	uses	resources	in	the	most
efficient,	effective	way	possible.
The	statement	that	“the	need	for	command	is	diminishing”	needs	to	be	qualified	by	the	cultural	requisites	of
different	countries.	This	observation	is	broadly	true,	thanks	in	part	to	the	effect	of	information	technology,	but	the
degree	to	which	it	applies	varies	considerably	from	one	country	to	another.	In	the	United	States,	the	management
of	large	emergencies	(such	as	Hurricane	Katrina	in	2005)	still	relies	on	considerable	input	from	military	and
paramilitary	forces	(i.e.,	the	National	Guard).	It	should	be	noted	that	the	response	to	Katrina	revealed	a	terrible	lack
of	preparedness	at	the	key	levels:	state	and	local	authority.	Here,	planning	was	extemporary,	but	compensatory
response	of	the	Federal	level	of	government	was	slow	and	initially	rather	disorganized.	Militarized	responses	are
very	important	in	China,	were	the	national	government	has	been	suspicious	of	the	rise	of	volunteer	groups.	In
many	other	countries,	military	forces	are	used	in	disasters	to	compensate	for	deficiencies	in	civilian	response,
which	may	be	poorly	organized	and	underfunded.	However,	in	almost	all	cases,	the	civilian	organization	of
response	to	disaster	is	improving,	including	in	the	field	of	planning,	which	lessens	the	need	for	help	from	military
forces.
Emergency	Planning	and	Ordinary	Citizens
A	significant	portion	of	a	good	emergency	plan	will	provide	instructions	on	how	to	relay	information	to	the	general
public.	The	role	of	and	tasks	allotted	to	a	spokesperson	may	need	to	be	defined.	In	democratic	countries,	the	mass
media	are	expected	to	have	a	role	that	is	independent	of	government,	but	also	to	bear	a	sense	of	responsibility
that	induces	them	to	provide	public	service	information	in	times	of	crisis.	Generally,	emergency	plans	can	specify
the	arrangements	for	working	with	the	media,	but	they	cannot	fully	co-opt	the	media	as	if	they	were	public
servants.	In	news	services,	a	degree	of	editorial	independence	is	necessary,	in	order	to	draw	attention	to	any
abuses	of	office	committed	by	members	of	a	government,	or,	for	that	matter,	emergency	responders.
Increasingly,	response	to	the	threat	and	impact	of	disaster	is	a	matter	of	human	rights.	There	are	many	ways	in
which	this	is	true.	For	example,	the	safety	and	well	being	of	girls	and	women	need	to	be	ensured	in	disaster,	as
well,	of	course,	as	at	all	other	times.	Disaster	should	not	be	an	opportunity	for	abuses	to	be	committed,	or	for
discrimination	against	women.	Emergency	planning	can	also	contribute	to	human	rights,	for	example,	by
embodying	the	principle	of	“design	for	all”	that	seeks	to	ensure	that	people	with	disabilities	are	not	forgotten,
discriminated	against,	or	abused	in	disaster	situations,	and	indeed,	that	they	are	given	the	assistance	they	need	to
give	them	as	much	parity	as	possible	with	people	who	do	not	have	disabilities.
Disaster and Emergency Planning for Preparedness, Response, and Recovery
Page 15 of 20
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, NATURAL HAZARD SCIENCE
(naturalhazardscience.oxfordre.com). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2013. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial
use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: University College London; date: 16 November 2015
In	the	modern	world,	disasters	have	been	occasion	for	forced	migration,	the	imposition	of	restrictive	ideologies,	the
persecution	of	minorities,	and	discrimination	against	marginalized	groups.	These	are	human	rights	abuses	that
need	to	be	counteracted.
Forced	migration	has	occurred	in	the	wake	of	disasters	in	countries	as	diverse	as	Myanmar	(formerly	Burma),
Indonesia,	and	the	United	States.	In	this,	the	upheaval	caused	by	disaster,	and	in	particular	the	destruction	of
housing	and	livelihoods,	has	been	used	as	an	opportunity	to	achieve	a	form	of	social	engineering,	by	moving
people	to	settle	areas	deemed	less	hazardous.	A	darker	form	of	this	is	the	persecution	of	minorities,	possibly	by
propelling	them	into	“ghettos”	and	enclaves.	Concurrently,	recovery	from	disaster	has	occasionally	become	the
opportunity	to	impose	ideologies,	as	was	the	case	with	the	introduction	of	Islamic	Sharia	law,	after	both	the	2004
tsunami	in	Banda	Aceh	and	the	2009	Padang	earthquake	in	Indonesia.	There	is	little	doubt,	moreover,	that	Cyclone
Nargis,	in	2008	in	Myanmar,	did	nothing	to	alleviate	the	persecution	of	the	Muslim	Rohingya	people	by	the	Burmese
junta.	Generally,	disasters	have	been	associated	with	the	occurrence,	and	possibly	intensification,	of
marginalization	right	across	the	board,	from	the	homeless	in	Tokyo	to	rural	communities	in	Zimbabwe,	minorities	in
the	United	States,	and	the	poor	of	Latin	American	cities	such	as	Managua	and	Lima.
At	the	very	least,	emergency	planners	need	to	ensure	that	there	is	nothing	in	the	plans	that	could	be	construed	as
a	means	of	facilitating	such	abuses.	It	is	as	well	to	remember	that	the	legacy	of	two	world	wars	was	political	hostility
to	emergency	planning,	which	was	seen	by	some	politicians	as	a	handmaiden	to	totalitarianism.	This	was	because
the	invocation	of	special	powers	to	deal	with	emergency	situations	was	viewed	as	a	dangerous	development	that
could	easily	be	subverted	towards	forms	of	dictatorship.	Fortunately,	these	fears	have	diminished	over	time.	They
have	largely	been	supplanted	by	an	understanding	of	the	imperatives	of	natural	and	technological	hazards,	with
their	capacity	to	retard	human	and	economic	development,	or	even	to	throw	such	processes	into	reverse.
Planning	the	Recovery	from	Disaster
The	so-called	“disaster	cycle”	refers	to	the	phases	of	resilience	building,	preparation,	emergency	response,
recovery,	and	reconstruction.	A	cycle	is	used	because	many	disasters	are	recurrent,	although	not	all	are	truly
cyclical.	Clearly,	emergency	and	disaster	planning	refer	primarily	to	the	response	phase.	However,	they	have
some	relevance	to	all	the	other	phases	as	well.	Emergency	planning	is	largely	practiced	during	the	risk	mitigation,
or	resilience-building,	phase—the	calm	periods	between	major	adverse	events.	It	must	address	the	preparation
phase	as	well	as	the	response	phase,	as	there	is	a	need	to	make	preparations	systematic,	especially	where	there
is	enough	prior	warning	of	impact	for	this	to	be	accomplished	successfully.	While	recovery	planning	may	be
regarded	as	a	separate	process	from	emergency	planning,	the	two	go	together	in	that	the	phases	of	recovery	offer
an	opportunity	to	improve	general	emergency	planning	and	readiness	for	the	next	impact.
In	most	sudden	impact	disasters,	there	is	no	reason	why	recovery	planning	should	not	begin	the	day	after	the
event.	Having	made	that	point,	however,	it	is	important	to	note	that	time	is	socially	necessary	in	recovery.
Consultation	must	take	place,	and	alternative	strategies	must	be	investigated.	The	aim	should	not	be	to	“bounce
back,”	but	to	“bounce	forward”	to	a	more	resilient	society	that	is	able	to	face	up	to	future	disasters	by	a	better
combination	of	resistance	and	adaptation	than	that	which	existed	before	the	current	impact.	Recovery	from	a
major	disaster	can	take	decades,	and	during	that	time	socio-economic	conditions	will	change,	and	so	probably	will
environmental	and	hazard	conditions.	A	disaster	characterized	by	death,	injury,	psychological	impairment,
destruction,	damage,	and	loss	of	economic	activities,	assets,	and	employment	will	engender	a	complex	aftermath.
In	this	there	is	much	potential	for	wrong	decisions,	unless	objectives	are	carefully	set,	procedures	are	clearly
identified,	and	there	is	a	consensus	about	how	the	process	should	take	place.
Major	disasters	such	as	large	floods,	cyclonic	storms,	and	earthquakes	may	not	only	take	a	large	toll	of	casualties
but	may	also	destroy	a	great	deal	of	housing	stock	and	business	premises.	This	will	stimulate	a	process	of
providing	shelter,	which	may	involve	temporary	and	transitional	solutions	to	the	housing	problem	before	permanent
reconstruction	of	building	stock	can	be	achieved.	In	this	process,	there	is,	or	rather	there	should	be,	a	social
contract	that	indicates	that	survivors	will	endure	the	privation	of	temporary	or	transitional	housing	providing	it	is	for
a	finite	and	not	excessive	period	of	time.	In	the	aftermath	of	the	March	2011	earthquake	and	tsunami	in
northeastern	Japan,	for	example,	88,870	houses	were	damaged,	most	of	them	being	completely	demolished	by	the
waves.	Reconstruction	will	take	about	seven	years,	which	is	a	remarkable	achievement	that	has	required	very
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intensive	planning	at	the	local,	regional,	and	national	levels.	Moreover,	the	planned	reconstruction	has	to	be
secure	against	future	tsunamis;	land	must	be	elevated,	sea	walls	must	be	constructed,	and	residential	areas	need
to	be	relocated	to	higher	ground,	all	on	an	unprecedented	scale.
The	example	of	Japan’s	response	to	the	most	expensive	natural	disaster	in	human	history	can	be	contrasted	with
that	of	other,	less	wealthy	nations.	The	impact	of	disaster	must	be	seen	in	relation	to	national	wealth	and	the	effect
of	a	catastrophe	on	a	nation’s	commerce,	trade,	and	livelihoods.	In	this	sense,	when	Cyclone	Haiyan	(known
locally	as	Yolanda)	made	landfall	in	the	Philippine	province	of	Eastern	Visayas	in	November	2013,	the	storm	surge,
which	reached	5	meters	in	height,	was	very	much	like	a	tsunami	and	every	bit	as	devastating.	Evacuation	saved
many	lives,	but	7,300	people	nevertheless	died	and	almost	29,000	were	injured.	In	this	economic	backwater	of
Philippine	life,	recovery	was	slow	and	patchy.	Many	survivors	received	very	little	assistance,	which	helped	to
perpetuate	vulnerability.	Although	evacuation	was	more	successful	when	the	next	major	cyclone	(named	Hagupit)
struck	in	December	2014,	many	of	the	reconstructed	shelters	of	poor	people	living	in	coastal	communities	were
once	again	washed	away.
Planning	for	Critical	Infrastructure	and	Supply	Chains
One	of	the	most	complex	and	challenging	aspects	for	recovery	planners	is	the	rebuilding	of	critical	infrastructure.
In	the	case	of	the	Japanese	Sanriku	coast,	where	the	2011	tsunami	came	on	land,	much	of	the	infrastructure	was
completely	devastated:	roads,	railways,	and	utility	distribution	networks	had	to	be	rebuilt	after	sustaining	a	very
high	level	of	damage.	Critical	infrastructure	(which	also	includes	sectors	such	as	food	distribution	and	banking)	can
be	divided	broadly	into	that	of	national	importance	and	that	of	purely	local	significance.	In	many	cases,	resilience
in	networks	is	a	function	of	being	able	to	find	different	routes	through	the	network.	However,	blockages	can	be
critical,	and	infrastructure	may	be	peculiarly	susceptible	to	cascading	disasters.	In	these,	the	consequences	of
one	failure	are	the	cause	of	others,	in	a	sort	of	“domino	effect.”	Thus,	the	Japanese	Tōhoku	earthquake	and
tsunami	caused	the	Fukushima	Dai’ichi	nuclear	reactor	meltdown	and	radiation	release.	The	tsunami	also	caused
failures	in	manufacturing	supply	chains	around	the	world,	as	a	result	of	shutting	down	vehicle	production	in	Japan.
Supply	chains	are	essential	to	humanitarian	operations	and	emergency	responses.	Emergency	planning	for	them
has	two	aspects.	The	first	is	an	element	of	business	continuity.	It	seeks	alternative	ways	to	ensure	supplies	of
goods	or	services,	in	order	to	keep	productivity	from	falling	as	a	result	of	interruption	of	normal	business.	It	thus
depends	on	redundancy,	which	is	potentially	an	expensive	quality,	as	it	may	require	the	duplication	of	assets.	This
requires	planners	to	determine	which	assets	are	critical,	and	where	the	destruction	or	failure	of	assets	may	have	a
critical	effect	on	the	whole	production	cycle.	The	second	aspect	of	supply	chain	planning	involves	ensuring
efficiency	in	humanitarian	supply,	such	that	the	forces	on	the	ground	are	not	left	bereft	of	the	equipment,	goods,
and	manpower	that	are	needed	to	tackle	the	emergency	effectively.
Reconstruction	Planning
Planning	to	manage	the	reconstruction	of	housing	involves	some	difficult	choices	about	who	should	build	what	and
where.	It	is	important	to	avoid	excessive	price	rises	in	the	market	for	building	materials.	It	is	also	essential	to
involve	local	people,	the	beneficiaries	in	the	process	of	designing,	constructing,	and	adapting	permanent	housing.
In	some	situations,	the	best	housing	is	built	by	its	users,	while	in	others	it	is	not	possible	to	learn	the	necessary
skills	and	so	contractors	must	be	used,	but	the	designs	should	respond	directly	to	the	users’	needs.
An	important	matter	in	reconstruction	planning	is	the	extent	to	which	transitional	shelter	should	be	provided.	If	the
terrain	studies,	site	urbanization,	preparation,	and	building	processes	are	likely	to	take	years,	and	if	funding	for
them	is	short,	then	it	may	be	necessary	to	put	people	in	temporary	accommodation,	usually	consisting	of	prefabs
or	so-called	“barrack	houses.”	The	space	allotted	per	family	varies	from	10	to	40	square	meters.	The	upper	limit	is
a	tacit	international	standard	that	comes	from	the	provision	of	transitional	shelter	in	countries	such	as	Italy	and
Turkey,	while	the	lower	limit	refers	to	very	basic	“bunkhouse”	provision	for	families	in	rural	locations	in	countries
such	as	Indonesia	and	the	Philippines.	In	Japan,	transitional	shelters	erected	after	the	2011	tsunami	had	floor	areas
of	27–33	square	meters,	while	those	in	Sichuan,	China	constructed	after	the	2008	Wenchuan	earthquake	were
slightly	smaller	than	20	square	meters	in	floor	area.	Hence,	the	figure	tends	to	be	lower	in	Asian	countries,	were
urban	space	is	limited	and	populations	are	large.	One	risk	of	transitional	housing	is	that	it	may	reduce	the	impetus
for	permanent	reconstruction,	and	thus	leave	the	survivors	in	limbo	for	years	or	decades.	The	solution	lies	in	both
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a	constant	provision	of	resources	for	recovery	and	a	transparent,	democratic	process	of	achieving	it,	with	ample
public	participation.
Recovery	and	reconstruction	planning	should	aim	to	revive	the	local	area	while	at	the	same	time	making	it	safer
against	future	disasters.	Revival	means	rebuilding	basic	facilities,	such	as	housing,	infrastructure,	and	amenities,
but	it	also	means	ensuring	that	livelihoods	and	the	local	economy	are	rebuilt.	Experience	suggests	that	this	is
easiest	for	settlements	that	are	well	connected	politically	and	geographically,	and	hardest	for	those	that	are
politically,	spatially	and	economically	marginalized.	There	is	a	welfare	function	in	recovery	from	disaster,	and	this
begs	the	question	of	what	welfare	should	involve.	At	its	worst,	copious	but	ill-thought-out	assistance	to	a	disaster
area	can	bring	the	population	into	a	state	of	aid	dependency	that	is	bound	to	end	in	negative	consequences,	as
the	assistance	is	unlikely	to	be	perpetual.	Reviving	the	local	economy	can	instead	create	self-sufficiency	and	tax
revenues	that	help	the	area	revive	itself.
Other	Aspects	of	Recovery	and	Reconstruction	Planning
The	fundamental	purpose	of	welfare	is	to	support	people	who	lack	the	ability	and	resources	to	provide	themselves
with	a	minimum	acceptable	standard	of	living.	Disaster	throws	this	issue	into	high	relief	by	differentially	affecting	the
poor	and	needy	more	than	the	wealthy.	Welfare	should	not	mean	largesse,	however	attractive	this	may	seem	to
politicians	when	they	remember	that	disaster	victims	are	also	voters.	Instead,	scarce	resources	should	be	utilized
to	provide	a	safety	net	for	the	most	vulnerable	people	in	society,	and	thus	to	mitigate	the	differential	effect	of
disaster.
From	these	reflections,	it	should	be	apparent	that	there	will	be	parallel	processes	of	planning	that	have	different
weights	and	salience	at	different	points	in	the	cycle	of	recurrent	disasters	(Figure	6).	To	ensure	a	holistic	response
to	the	threat	of	disaster,	recovery,	and	reconstruction,	planning	should	be	linked	to	on-going	emergency	planning
initiatives	and	to	business	continuity	planning.	Urban	and	regional	planning	should	have	links	to	all	of	these
processes,	because	they	are	all	about	reducing	the	risk	to	development	and	all	about	the	“hazardousness	of
place.”
Click	to	view	larger
Figure	6. 	Parallel	forms	of	planning	in	the	sequence	of	response	to	and	recovery	from	disasters.
Conclusion:	The	Future	of	Disaster	and	Emergency	Planning
In	recent	decades,	there	has	been	a	consistent	upward	trend	in	the	impact	of	disasters.	Rising	populations	in	the
areas	of	greatest	hazard,	increasing	investment	in	fixed	capital	in	such	places,	the	complexity	of	global
interconnections,	and	the	impact	of	climate	change	in	producing	more	extreme	meteorological	events	all	conspire
to	drive	this	trend.	It	has	propelled	disaster	management	from	a	recherché	concept	to	a	vital	discipline,	in	which
there	is	an	increasing	process	of	professionalization.	Standards	and	guidelines	for	disaster	planning	do	exist,
although	none	has	been	universally	accepted	as	the	basic	model.	Nevertheless,	there	is	a	gathering	consensus	on
what	emergency	plans	should	seek	to	achieve	and	how	they	should	be	structured.
Dealing	with	disaster	is	a	social	process	that	has	environmental	and	economic	ramifications	and	implications	in
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terms	of	governance.	Emergency	planning	needs	to	fit	into	a	comprehensive	program	of	risk	reduction,	in	which
structural	defenses	are	built—for	example,	river	levees	and	sea	walls;	non-structural	measures	are	used	in	a
diversified	strategy	to	bring	risk	under	control	and	reduce	the	impact	of	disasters.	The	non-structural	approach
includes	not	only	emergency	planning	and	management	but	also	land-use	control,	public	education,	and	possibly,
relocation	of	the	premises	that	are	most	at	risk.
Emergency	planning	now	has	to	face	up	to	the	challenges	of	the	information	age,	in	which	there	is	much	more
immediacy	to	the	means	of	communication.	Social	media	can	be	used	to	warn	people,	collect	information	from	the
field,	manage	public	response,	answer	the	public’s	questions,	and	devise	new	ways	of	managing	the	emergency.
For	example,	social	media	have	begun	to	have	an	important	role	in	accounting	for	missing	people	in	disaster.
Crowd	sourcing	and	cooperative	efforts	can	be	powerful	tools	in	the	response	to	crises	and	emergency	situations.
Hence,	social	media	and	Internet	communications	need	to	be	taken	into	account	in	emergency	planning.
Over	the	period	2004–2013,	almost	two	billion	people	were	directly	affected	by	disaster.	In	1995,	the	Kobe
earthquake	in	Japan	was	the	world’s	most	costly	disaster	ever	to	have	occurred,	with	total	losses	and	costs	of
US$132.5	billion.	The	2011	Tōhoku	earthquake	and	tsunami	will	easily	surpass	this.	Moreover,	enormous	potential
for	casualties	and	losses	exists	in	the	world’s	megacities,	such	as	Tokyo,	Tehran,	and	Istanbul.	Emergency
planning	is	thus	facing	a	challenge	that	is	very	much	greater	and	more	complex	than	it	appeared	to	be	in	the
1960s,	when	the	first	attempts	were	made	to	devise	a	systematic	approach	to	it.	Emergency	planners	will	need	to
be	more	professional	and	to	benefit	from	more,	and	more	sophisticated,	training.	Information	technology	will	play	an
increasing	role	in	planning.	It	is	already	prominent,	for	instance,	in	the	use	of	geographic	information	systems
(GISs)	to	depict	hazards,	vulnerabilities,	and	patterns	of	emergency	response.	GIS	is	already	an	integral	part	of
many	emergency	plans.
Another	challenge	of	contemporary	emergency	planning	is	internationalization.	Cross-border	disasters	are
common,	and	any	increase	in	the	size	and	strength	of	meteorological	disasters	will	increase	their	importance.	Most
emergency	planning	is	designed	to	cope	with	local,	regional,	or	at	least	domestic	inputs,	but	less	so	international
ones,	as	these	tend	to	be	much	less	predictable.	However,	it	will	become	increasingly	necessary	to	guarantee
international	interoperability,	common	supply	chains,	reciprocal	aid	arrangements,	and	procedures	for	working
together	across	borders.
Finally,	more	informed	decisions	will	have	to	be	made	about	the	magnitude	of	events	for	which	a	response	needs	to
be	planned.	The	apparent	tendency	for	climate	to	drive	increases	in	extreme	meteorological	events	is	only	one
element	of	a	complex	picture	in	which	the	distributions	of	magnitudes	and	frequencies	are	not	accurately	known.
Resources	are	too	scarce	to	permit	lavish	preparations	for	notional	high-impact	events	that	may	occur	only	once
in	a	millennium.	However,	preparedness	does	need	to	raise	its	sights	and	tackle	larger	events	than	those	that	can
confidently	be	expected	to	occur	in	a	decade.	Given	restrictions	on	public	spending,	this	will	mean	achieving
efficiencies	and	reducing	waste	in	emergency	response,	as	well	as	developing	a	robust	moral	philosophy	and
ethical	position	on	who	deserves	what	in	the	post-disaster	period.
Future	emergency	plans	will	be	digital	creations	that	are	networked,	interactive,	and	dynamically	supported	by
different	kinds	of	media,	including	real-time	filming	and	photography	and	networked	teleconferencing.	One
challenge	here	is	to	ensure	that	the	increasing	dependency	on	sophisticated	electronic	algorithms	and
communications	does	not	create	vulnerability	in	its	own	right.	Discharged	batteries	and	failed	networks	of
electricity	supplies	can	be	enough	to	make	information	and	communications	technologies	useless	at	the	height	of	a
crisis.
As	noted,	emergency	planning	needs	to	be	a	co-operative	endeavor	and,	as	such,	it	is	bound	up	with	questions	of
rights,	responsibilities,	and	democratic	participation.	The	plans	that	work	the	best	have	the	broadest	support.	They
are	also	well	known	to	participants	and	are	frequently	referred	to.	Like	all	of	the	principal	aspects	of	modern	life,
emergency	planning	and	management	need	to	be	sustainable	endeavors.	There	are	two	sides	to	this.	One	is	to
ensure	that	the	planning	process	is	continuous,	and	support	for	the	civil	protection	system	in	which	it	takes	places
does	not	wane	during	the	intervals	between	disasters.	Budget	cuts	can	throw	valid	programs	of	safety	and	security
into	reverse,	but	disasters	are,	unfortunately,	inevitable	events.	The	other	side	is	the	need	to	integrate	emergency
planning	into	the	general	process	of	planning	to	make	human	life	more	sustainable.	It	will	therefore	require
interfaces	with	climate	change	adaptation	plans	and	programs	of	sustainable	resource	usage.	These	are	significant
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challenges,	and	they	add	up	to	a	process	of	“mainstreaming”	emergency	and	disaster	planning.	The	alternatives,
inefficient	and	ineffective	responses	to	the	threat	and	impact	of	disasters,	delayed	recovery,	and	vulnerable
reconstruction,	should	not	be	allowed	in	any	society,	rich	or	poor.
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